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"If every speaker who has talked in the last 
twenty years or so about federal-state relations in water 
law were laid end to end, it would be a good and merciful 
thing . . . [w]hatever the hue and stripe of his 
persuasions . . . everyone, I suspect, has reached a common 
conclusion. Federal-state relations are not satisfactory."
Charles E. Corker, Professor of Law, 
University of Washington 
School of Law (July, 1971).
"That a gurgling stream, from whose shady depths 
occasionally a silver fish flashes and a variety of 
indistinct furry heads take furtive sips is not an integral 
part of the forest through which it winds, is a thought 
which would never occur to a poet, [or] a small boy . . . ."
Walter Kiechel, Jr.,
Attorney at Law 
(October, 1976)
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DISCLAIMER
Though I am employed by the U.S.D.A. Forest Service 
and am involved with securing and administering federal 
water rights, this professional paper has been prepared 
totally outside my official capacity. I believe that my 
professional experience, combined with my work in Montana 
water law and politics as a graduate student in Environmental 
Studies at the University of Montana, have afforded me a 
knowledge (and appreciation) of both the federal and state 
perspective. The opinions and conclusions developed in 
this paper are not necessarily those of the U.S.D.A. Forest 
Service.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
As Professor Corker laments (frontpiece), few topics 
have been discussed in such quantity, for so long, with such 
vigor, and with such lack of progress as federal-state rela­
tions in water law. This paper was undertaken only because 
the State of Montana is approaching the problem in a new and 
potentially precedent-setting manner. The purpose of the 
paper is to document the potential opportunities and 
problems associated with the ongoing federal/state/tribal 
water rights compact negotiations in Montana. Although 
negotiations between federal and state governments and 
Indian tribes have been used sparingly in the past for 
settling site-specific water rights disputes, Montana’s 
statewide negotiation process, in conjunction with general 
water rights adjudications, is the first of its kind in the 
nation. The principal questions to be investigated in this 
paper are:
1) Does the negotiation process offer a significant
potential to resolve the conflicts and uncertainties 
related to the need for quantification of federal 
(and Indian) reserved water rights and Indian 
aboriginal water rights in Montana?
- 1 -
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2) Can the process reach its legislatively-defined goal of 
"concluding compacts for the equitable division and 
apportionment of waters between the State and its people, 
the several Indian tribes, and the agencies of the 
Federal government claiming reserved water rights 
within the State
The compact negotiation process is just started, and 
may take several years to complete. Little can now be 
concluded with confidence about it. Yet, there are some 
advantages in documenting the issues and the process itself 
now, in its early stages. If it is successful, other 
western states might profit from a discussion of its goals 
and early problems and successes. Also, many of the 
participants and observers in the Montana effort do not yet 
fully understand the issues involved. An objective of this 
paper is to document, as succinctly as possible, the 
origins and current status of these issues. The paper will 
endorse the position, for example, that Indian water rights 
and those of federal agencies, though interrelated, are 
sufficiently distinct to be considered separately in compact 
negotiations.
Another objective of this paper is to examine the 
principles, or elements, of a successful negotiated 
settlement. There must be, for example, clear advantages 
for both sides before an agreement can be reached. There
^Montana Code Annotated (MCA), Title 85, Chapter 2,
701-704.
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must also be a willingness to compromise. Once the elements 
are identified, the question of whether they are present in 
the Montana compact negotiation process will be explored. 
Potential obstacles to a successfully negotiated settlement 
will be identified and discussed within that context.
The final, and perhaps most important, objective of 
this paper is to contribute to the success of the Montana 
compact negotiation process by defining and documenting 
some potential "middle ground" solutions to the problem of 
quantifying federal reserved water rights. To limit the 
scope of that portion of the paper, only non-Indian reserved 
rights, in particular those of the U.S.D.A., Forest Service, 
are considered in detail. Recommendations are made that 
reserved rights for instream water uses be recognized by the 
State of Montana to the mutual benefit of both parties (and 
ultimately to the public).
It is the author’s hope that this paper may be of 
use to both parties in the current negotiations, perhaps in 
more fully understanding the issues involved and the 
position of the other side. Similarly, it would be 
gratifying if. some of the specific recommendations might 
ultimately find their way into a future reserved water 
rights compact between the State of Montana and the Federal 
government.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Since the passage of the Water Use Act in 1973,  ̂
the State of Montana has made significant strides toward
a comprehensive, centralized approach to water policy and
2a statewide system of water rights records. Rapidly 
expanding energy development activities and far-reaching 
plans have underscored the urgent need for Montana to 
define its current and future water needs. Some of the 
largest unanswered questions deal with the role of the 
Federal government and the various Indian tribes in managing
3the limited water resources of the State.
The worst fears of state government lie with the 
ill-defined federal pre-emptive powers that result from the 
supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. It seems clear 
that, if it so desires, Congress may override state policies 
that limit transbasin or interstate transport of water.
In this regard, Montana must rely on a continuation of the
Montana Code Annotated, Title 85, Chapter 2.
^See R. E. Eagle, "The Politics of Water Allocation 
in Montana," Montana Business Quarterly. (Autumn 1978).
3See David Ladd, "Protecting Montana's Water : 
Support for a State Water Plan," and R. E. Eagle and R. A.
Russell, "Water Rights Issues in Montana.”
-4-
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longstanding reluctance of Congress to meddle in the 
traditional domain of state government in water rights 
administration.
The second largest area of concern and uncertainty 
relates to the extent and impacts of the judicially 
defined federal reserved water rights doctrine--applicable 
to federal lands such as national parks, national forests, 
and to reservations held in trust for the various Indian 
tribes. Spawned in a U.S. Supreme Court case on the Fort 
Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana in 1908 (Winters vs. 
United States), the reserved rights doctrine still lacks 
much specific definition. Federal reserved rights, which 
have come to be defined as that quantity of water needed to 
accomplish the purposes of the reservation, are in theory 
open-ended in time. The water need not be used until 
required, and the right is not lost through nonuse. That 
aspect of the reserved right is contrary to the concept of 
prior appropriation upon which most western states' laws 
are predicated.
Since the purposes of most federal reservations are 
not expressly stated in the documentation, it is very 
difficult for a state to determine the magnitude of the 
rights. And, worst of all, federal reserved water rights 
are not dependent upon state laws or procedural requirements
^Winters vs. United States. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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for legitimacy. Because of these features, the federal
reserved right creates substantial uncertainty over anyone's
right to use water on or near federal reservations :
We have a situation in which the federal sovereign 
claims water rights which are nowhere formally listed, 
which are not the subject of any decree or permit, 
and which, therefore, are etheric [sic] in large part 
to the person who has reason to know and evaluate the 
extent of his priorities to the use of water. To 
have these federal rights in a state of uncorrelated 
mystery is frustrating and completely contrary to 
orderly procedure . . . .̂
This uncertainty threatens havoc in administering water
rights in Montana and jeopardizes the otherwise substantial
gains that have been made since 1973.
The degree of uncertainty surrounding Indian water 
rights, for a variety of reasons, is substantially greater. 
The landmark Yellowstone water reservation process, 
completed in December 1978, did not deal with Indian rights 
at all :
It has been said that the Board (Natural 
Resources and Conservation) wasted its time in making 
reservations (for instream and future municipal and 
agricultural uses) because the Indians' water claims 
are not yet settled. That may well be true for those 
parts of the basin affected by the Indian water 
claims . . . [and] the Board knew this all too well, 
but the Board was required by State law and the 
Montana Supreme Court to complete its task by a certain
Walter J. Kiechel and Kenneth J. Burke, "Federal- 
State Relations in Water Resources Adjudication and 
Administration? Integration of Reserved Rights with 
Appropriâtive Rights," in Proceedings of the Eighteenth 
Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 18 (1973):536, 
quoting Colorado Supreme Court, 458 Pacific 2nd 760 at 765.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
time. It did not have the option of waiting for the 
slow legal^wheels to grind out the Indian water 
decisions.
A 1978 Comptroller General's Report to Congress
concluded that the federal reserved rights problem is
causing considerable controversy and litigation, leads to
economic and social disruption, and inhibits the efficient
8use of scarce western water resources.
Though it has been underscored in Montana by recent 
energy development plans, the problem has existed for 
several decades while little real progress has been made 
in solving it. Litigation at all levels of the judicial 
system has clarified some very specific points and resulted 
in a minor amount of quantification of reserved rights.
But many large, key questions remain unanswered and the 
vast majority of federal rights unquantified. To date, 
the courts have been the only effective forum available.
Yet the Supreme Court has only rarely addressed the subject,
9and when it has, it has not spoken consistently or plainly.
Dr. Wilson F. Clark (member, Montana Board of 
Natural Resources and Conservation), "A Free-Flowing Yellow­
stone : The Reservations Challenge," Montana Outdoors. Vol.
10, No. 2, (March/April 1979), quoted in Eagle and Russell, 
p . 15.
oU.S. Comptroller General, Report to Congress on 
Reserved Water Rights for Federal and Indian Reservations:
A Growing Controversy in Need of Resolution, Report fCED-78 
176 (1978), p. C -104. (Referred to hereafter as "Comptrol­ler General's Report.")
9For a brief discussion of the development of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Though there are some who still advocate judicial determi­
nation,^® the historical trend seems to indicate that 
litigation is not the answer for a quick resolution of the 
need to quantify federal or Indian reserved rights.
An obvious alternative to litigation would be for 
Congress to clarify the reservation doctrine and require 
quantification under certain legislatively determined 
conditions. Though as many as fifty bills have attempted 
to do so, none have been successful. The latest attempt, 
entitled the "Reserved Water Rights Coordination Act of
1980," is expected by its sponsors to be introduced into the
12United States Senate soon. Similar to other state-oriented 
bills before it, the bill would terminate all unexercised 
federal non-Indian reserved rights, quantify and correlate
reserved rights doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court, see U.S., 
Presidential Water Policy Task Force 5a, Report of Federal 
Task Force on Non-Indian Reserved Rights Tbraft), June 1979, 
pp. 6-10. (Referred to hereafter as "Task Force 5a Report.") 
For a more detailed discussion, see U.S., Department of 
Interior, Solicitor's Opinion #M36914, Federal Water Rights 
of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service. 
Bureau of Land Management, and Bureau of Reclamation.
25 June 1979. (Hereafter referred to as "Solicitor's 
Opinion.")
^®Alan E. Boles, Jr., and Charles M. Elliott,
"United States vs. New Mexico and the Course of Federal 
Reserved Rights," University of Colorado Law Review 51 
(Winter, 1980),215.
^^Comptroller General's Report, p. C -150.
12C. Roe, "Reserved Water Rights Coordination Act of 
1980," (Draft of a bill proposed for introduction in U.S. 
Congress), April, 1980.
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9
reserved rights with state authorized rights, strictly limit 
the exercise of Indian reserved rights, and provide for 
federal compensation of junior water right holders Injured 
by the exercise of federal rights. An obvious, and 
unavoidable, failing of all such proposed legislative 
solutions is that their comprehensive nature necessitates 
heavily favoring one of the two extreme positions. The 
complexity and diversity of the issues involved seem to 
preclude a blanket legislative compromise that would be 
constructive in every instance. In the past, such compre­
hensive proposals have failed "because the intense and often 
antagonistic views of Indians, federal, state, and private
interests have precluded the sort of consensus that is a
13precondition to Congressional action on such matters."
If the Roe bill is introduced, there is little reason to 
believe that Congress is any more capable now of reaching 
a timely and acceptable compromise than it has been in the 
past. Rather, a more case specific legislative adjudication 
approach would seem more likely to succeed--as it has in the 
past when other potential solutions have failed. The most 
notable example of such Congressional apportionment of 
water supplies is the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 
December 21, 1928--which provided for division of the waters 
of the Colorado River between the upper basin states 
(Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming) and the lower basin states
^^Boles and Elliott, p. 215.
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(California, Arizona, and Nevada) after attempts at inter­
state compact negotiations had amounted to nothing.
Recently a third approach toward reaching a timely 
solution to the problem--that of administrative (executive 
branch) action--has been receiving considerable attention. 
President Carter's water policy initiatives of June 6, 1978^^ 
and subsequent directives established a policy for federal 
agencies to "increase the level and quality of your 
attention to the identification of federal reserved water 
rights and to move forward with a program for establishing 
and quantifying these rights." The policy stresses the use 
of administrative means to accomplish the task. Where 
disputes arise, the President directed federal agencies to 
"negotiate and settle such rights in an orderly and final 
manner, seeking a balance with conflicting and established 
water uses . . . .  Seek formal adjudication only as a 
last resort."
The President’s water policy statement marks a new 
compromise position, of sorts, in federal water rights 
assertions. In a news release dated June 23, 1979,
Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, summarized that 
new position:
To my mind, one of the most important elements 
of the President's message was his directive to use
President Carter’s Water Policy Message to Congress 
(June 6. 1978), reprinted in Environmental Reporter 
9:228 (1978).
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a 'reasonable standard' in asserting federal reserved 
rights. That means asserting only those rights which 
reflect our true water needs, the 'minimum' we must 
have to manage federal lands as Congress has directed.
It means we must not--I repeat, not -- seek the 
broadest theoretical extension of all possible legal 
rights.
In a letter to western governors, Andrus went on to say that 
"President Carter's directive to all federal agencies to 
move promptly, in cooperation with Western States, to 
quantify federal reserved rights is a marked departure from 
the silence or stubborn intransigence of prior administra­
tions .
On July 12, 1978, President Carter issued thirteen 
directives covering various aspects of his water policy 
message to Congress six days earlier. One such directive 
established a Task Force (#5a) on Federal Non-Indian 
Reserved Water Rights. A draft of the Task Force Report 
issued in June, 1979 found several reasons for a lack of 
progress toward quantifying federal reserved rights --among 
them the fact that there has been a lack of a comprehensive
1 7legal policy within and among the agencies. That problem 
still exists a year later. In keeping with the President's
Cited in Simms, Richard A., "National Water Policy 
in the Wake of United States vs. New Mexico." Natural 
Resources Journal 20 (January7 1980);12.
^^U.S. Secretary of Interior, Memorandum to Governors 
Scott Matheson (Utah) and Ed Herschler (Wyoming) regarding 
assertion of federal water rights, 4 February 1980.
^^Task Force 5a Report, p. 19.
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directives, the Task Force Report recommended a policy that
"the United States should try to negotiate agreements with
each state to protect the interests of the states in
systematically identifying and administering water rights,
while protecting the interests of the United States in
18relying on reserved rights.”
Another reason cited by the Task Force for lack of
progress was the failure of western states, with some
relatively recent exceptions, to systematically adjudicate
19water rights within their borders. There is a tendency 
not to accept federal reserved and Indian water rights as a 
fact of life. By so doing, the states fail to provide 
sensible mechanisms with which to deal with them. All too 
recently, blanket statements of denial and oversimplifi­
cation have been the response of state officials. Such
statements as "federal and Indian reserved rights do not
20extend to instream uses" were common.
In Montana, at least, the mechanisms and intent to 
adjudicate all water rights, including federal and Indian
^^Ibid., p. 46.
^^Ibid., p. 20.
20Interstate Conference on Water Rights Problems. 
Special Task Force Report on the Proposed Federal Water 
Rights Legislation (February 1975). paraphrased in 
Robert S. Pelcyger, "Indian Water Rights : Some Emerging
Frontiers," Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 21;754.
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rights, are now firmly in place with the passage of Senate
Bill 76 by the 1979. Montana legislature. The law recognizes
that the success or failure of the effort will depend
largely on the State's ability to adjudicate federal and
Indian claims concurrently. The legislature also established
a Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission empowered to
21negotiate claims with federal and Indian officials. The 
primary purpose of the Commission is to establish these 
claims, or a framework and timetable for quantifying the 
claims, so that the planned general adjudications under the 
new law will proceed more smoothly. While negotiations for 
a compact are being pursued, there is a statutory suspension 
of action to adjudicate Indian and federal water rights 
until July 1, 1982.^^
The Montana Reserved Rights Compact Commission, 
chartered by the 1979 Montana legislative assembly, consists 
of nine members --four of which are legislators (see 
Appendix A). The Commission is chaired by Henry Loble of 
Helena, an attorney quite experienced in Montana and western 
water law. Two state employees, Scott Brown and David Ladd, 
have been added to the staff of the Water Sciences Bureau, 
Water Resources Division, Department of Natural Resources 
and Conservation to assist the Commission as program manager
^^MCA, 85-2-702, 703. 
^^MCA, 85-2-217.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
and staff attorney (respectively). Contacts have been made
by the Commission with all Indian tribes and federal
agencies thought to claim water rights in Montana. Active
negotiations are underway with the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai tribes and the Northern Cheyennes. Several meetings
have been held with federal officials, but procedural items
and questions of authority have so far precluded active 
23negotiations.
23Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana, 
8 August 1980.
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III. NATURE OF ISSUES--FEDERAL AND 
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
The Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission is
charged with two related, but distinct tasks. The first is
negotiation with Indian tribes^ and the second is negotiation
2with federal agencies. Though the reserved rights of each
3owe their existence to the "Winters Doctrine," many of the 
issues involved are quite different.
All reserved right claims have certain character­
istics that cause them to be troublesome to state water 
administrators. First, the claims may pre-empt state created 
rights because there is as yet no requirement that the 
agencies or tribes disclose the claims until they choose to 
exercise them. Reserved rights are not lost through non-use. 
Secondly, the claim may extend to uses potentially broader
^MCA, 85-2-701, 702.
^MCA, 85-2-703.
3The "Winters Doctrine" is the name given to the 
judicially-created federal reserved water rights as 
articulated in Winters vs. United States [207 US 564 (1908)] 
and expanded through subsequent court decisions.
-15 "
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than those recognized as "beneficial uses" under state law.'  ̂
The issues raised when reserved rights are asserted are :
1) was an intent (by Congressional action or Executive 
Order) present?
2) how much water was available?
3) how much of the available water was actually 
reserved ?̂
In nearly every case, the documentation upon which those 
asserting reserved water rights rely does not expressly 
answer any of those three questions. For that reason, the 
judicially-created legal principle is often referred to as 
the "implied reservation doctrine." Because of the long 
history of judicial support of the existence of Congressional 
or Executive intent, it is appropriate to conclude, 
as one observer does, that "genuine apprehension about 
federal reserved water rights arises not because they are 
'federal' or 'reserved', but because thay are 'implied'."^ 
There are no agreed upon rules, and few consistent judicial
Sally K. Fairfax and Dan A. Tarlock, "No Water for 
the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United States vs. New
Mexico. " Idaho Law Review 15 (Summer 1979) :521.
^C. Steven McMurry, "Comment-Implied Reservation 
Claims after Caeopaert vs. United States." Arizona State 
Law Journal, 1977:655.
^Charles E. Corker, "Federal-State Relations in 
Water Rights Adjudication and Administration," in Proceedings 
of the Seventeenth Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute, 17:588.
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interpretations, that can be relied upon to help discover 
how much water was reserved. Two other questions, now being 
raised with greater frequency, are:
1) when was the water reserved?
2) (in the case of Indians) by whom was the water 
reserved?
These two questions relate to a recent tendency by both 
federal agencies and Indian tribes to assert rights through 
different authorities, distinct from the federal reserved 
rights doctrine. There is some question whether the Montana 
Reserved Water Rights Commission has the authority to 
negotiate such claims, though its Chairman believes that 
it does.^
In the case of Indian tribes, increasing emphasis 
is being placed on what have been termed 'aboriginal water 
rights'--i.e., unextinguished rights to use water that 
Indians hold as a result of its prior use by their ancestors 
from time immemorial on ancestral lands still remaining in
OIndian ownership. By asserting these rights, the tribes 
hope to sever some dependence on the federal government
7Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana,
8 August 1980.
8For in-depth treatments of Indian aboriginal rights, 
see William H. Veeder, "Indian Prior and Paramount Rights 
to the Use of Water," Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute. 16:631-668 and James L. 
Merrill, "Aboriginal Water Rights,” Natural Resources 
Journal 20 (January 1980):45-70.
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and its reserved water rights while taking advantage of
recent favorable federal judicial decisions concerning a
similar issue--the rights of Indians to hunt and fish on
their ancestral lands. The concept, though generally
untested in court, has a potential to be an even bigger
threat to state control of water than Indian reserved rights.
In Montana, Northern Cheyene Tribal Resolution No. 179 (74),
dated March 25, 1974, asserts such rights as follows:
[The tribe] does hereby claim . . . that the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe is entitled and now has and 
at all times had, the first, paramount and aboriginal 
right to the use of all waters [flowing upon or 
beneath the Reservation] . . . and hereby declares 
and claims the aboriginal right to the appropriation, 
use, and storage of all said waters . . . .
Though dismissed by some as an "all conquering 
battle-cry of those who would recapture the birthright of 
the American I n d i a n , a boriginal  water rights do appear to 
have a rational and ethical basis in fact, irrespective of 
the legal determinations that will be forthcoming. They 
will undoubtedly be asserted by the tribes through the 
Montana negotiation process, to some as yet undeterminable 
extent.
^Cited in Merrill (supra), p. 48.
^^Paul L. Bloom, "Indian 'Paramount' Rights to 
Water Use," Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Institute (July 9-11, 1970). 16:669
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For its part, the Federal government has recently 
developed its own "non-reserved" rights theory--also 
untested by the courts. The Solicitor of the Department of 
Interior found, in a legal opinion dated June 25, 1979, 
that the Federal government may establish non-reserved 
rights to water for "Congressionally authorized management 
of unreserved lands or reserved lands for objectives apart 
from the original reservation purpose(s). Moreover, such 
rights could be legally established whether or not the state 
recognized its purpose as legitimate under its laws. In 
response to the furor created by western water users and 
state officials, fearful of a new series of court battles 
and uncertainties, Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus 
directed his agencies that there be "no blanket, across-the- 
board claims for non-reserved rights formally asserted,” 
without his appr oval.However,  in the same memorandum, 
he left open the possibility that it might be necessary to 
assert such rights to protect federal water needs in 
situations where statutory or court deadlines exist for 
comprehensive filing of all water rights. That is the 
situation in Montana, where all rights, including federal 
and Indian rights, must be filed by January 1, 1982.^^
11U.S., Secretary of Interior, Memorandum to Interior 
Department agencies regarding assertion of federal water 
rights, 4 February 1980.
^^MCA, 85-2-212.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
Secretary of Agriculture Bob Bergland has committed his 
Department (which includes the Forest Service) to a similar 
policy.
In addition to the different authorities under which 
federal and Indian "non-reserved” rights may be asserted, 
there are several other major reasons why Indian and 
non-Indian federal rights should be considered as separate 
and distinct issues. The first of these is the fact that, 
unlike most Indian reservations, federal lands tend to be 
located relatively high in the watershed, and most claims 
will be for non-consumptive water uses (such as instream 
flows) which preserve the water for appropriation downstream 
under state law. The Task Force 5a Report found that to 
be the major cause of their optimistic finding that 
accommodation of federal rights to state interests "may not 
be as intractable in fact as some might perceive them to be 
in theory." No such optimism can be generated for the 
Indian situation, where consumptive uses, low in watershed, 
will predominate.
Federal and Indian water rights are both held by 
the government in trust for the people of the United States, 
but in markedly different ways and with significantly 
distinct implications. Federal rights are held for the
13U.S., Secretary of Agriculture, Memorandum to 
Secretary of Interior regarding assertion of federal water 
rights, 7 April 1980.
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public at large under what is termed the "public trust 
d o c t r i n e . I n c u m b e n t  upon the government is the responsi­
bility to take into account the public nature and the quality 
of water in making decisions regarding its use. It is well 
established under the law that such rights are subject to 
change and diminution by the government (subject to judicial 
review) if it is in the public interest. Since members of 
the public have no property rights in such water, no 
compensation is due. Of course, the public trust also 
suggests that the wholesale giveaway of federal rights by the
government, to the detriment of the aquatic ecosystem or other
15environments, is unreasonable and therefore illegal.
Indian rights, at least those existing under the 
federal reservation authority, are held in trust for the 
tribe and its people under a unique arrangement similar to 
that of a guardian to his ward. The government may not 
simply use the public interest test to weigh the benefits 
of two alternative uses of that water. This relationship 
has led the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) 
and many tribal governments to insist that "Indian water
For a discussion of the public trust doctrine, 
see Felix E. Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine. Instream 
Flows. and Resources. (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service-- 
March, 1980) and Joseph Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,”
Michigan Law Review 68 (1970):473-566.
^^Smith, p. 22.
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rights are protected by the 5th Amendment [and] [a]ny 
compromise, appropriation, or expropriation of Indian water 
rights . . . will entitle tribes to compensation under the 
5th Amendment. The federal government has recognized 
that Indian rights are private, not public rights.
As alluded to above, the U.S. government as a 
trustee to the tribes is bound to strictly protect the rights 
and interests of its beneficiaries --the Indian people. Yet 
the Department of Justice is continually, and increasingly 
placed into a position of conflict of interest in litigation 
where it must not only protect Indian rights but also 
claim federal rights of various agencies that may be totally
T Oincompatible with the Indian claims. The Indian people 
also charge that other violations of the federal trust have 
been occurring when Congress has appropriated funds for 
reclamation water projects on rivers in which Indians have 
Winters claims without providing sufficient capital for 
development of their rights. The net result, from the 
Indian perspective, is the development of junior non-Indian
1 AAlbert W. Trimble (Executive Director, National 
Congress of American Indians), Letter (7/10/78) to United 
States General Accounting Office in response to Comptroller 
General's Report to Congress. For additional information, 
see "NCAI to GAO: Legislative Quantification of Indian
Water Rights is not the Answer," American Indian Journal, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, (January 1979):33-36.
^^Comptroller General's Report, p. C -113.
18Veeder, p. 664. See also : U.S. Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, Federal Encroachment on Indian Water
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water rights with heavy federal subsidization--a discrimina­
tory action that unduly complicates future Indian water 
developments. The Federal government may also violate its 
trusteeship responsibilities by failing to provide Indians 
with the legal and technical assistance necessary to 
participate effectively in Winters rights quantification 
proceedings.
In addition to the differences in trust responsibil­
ities of the federal government, Indian and other federal 
reserved water rights also differ substantially as to the 
purposes for which the reservations were established. Most 
non-Indian federal reservations require water mostly for 
non-consumptive uses. Traditionally, Indian water rights 
have been assumed to stem from the federal government's 
desire to make farmers of the tribes --i<e., water for 
agriculture. The amount of irrigable acres has long been 
used as a yardstick for quantifying Indian reserved rights. 
Admittedly, agriculture was, in most cases, the 
purpose for which the Congress or the President originally 
set aside Indian reservations (although this purpose was 
seldom expressly stated). Yet, it has been established by
Rights and the Impairment of Reservation Development. 91st 
Congress, 1st Session (1970).
19Robert H. Abrams, "Reserved Water Rights, Indian 
Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction;
River Decision/' Stanford Law Review 30 (July19/8;: 11145.
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the courts that, in determining the extent of implied 
federal and Indian reserved rights today, the courts may 
not be strictly bound to circumstances dating from the 
actual reservation. They may extrapolate the concept of 
federal purpose to the present context.
In other words, the courts need not (though they 
21sometimes still do) attempt to determine what was on the 
minds of certain lawmakers back at the time of establishment 
of the reservations. That, of course, often proves to be a 
massive, if not futile, undertaking--since it is difficult 
enough to determine the motives of legislators on contempo­
rary issues. In the words of noted water law expert 
Frank Trealease*
If this view of reserved rights were accurate 
there would be some hope for the contentions of some 
who would limit reserved rights to the bounds 
established by the ignorance of the reservation founders. 
Rather, it seems likely that intent [emphasis added] 
is a presumption that if water is needed to accomplish 
the purposes of a reservation as now perceived, then 
enough unappropriated water was reserved to fulfill 
those purposes. There is no intent to find--the parties 
simply never thought about the m a t t e r . ^2
20McMurry, p. 670, (citing Caennaert vs. United States).
21A recent example of where the court limited itself 
strictly to a study of the intent of the legislators at the 
time of reservation is United States vs. New Mexico.
22Maxfield, Dietrich, and Trealease, "Indian Water 
Rights for Mineral Development," in Natural Resources Law 
on American Indian Lands. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation (Boulder, Colorado), 1977.
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Thus, it is conceivable that modern courts could determine
that the purpose of Indian reservations is to provide
Indians equal opportunity with other Americans to achieve
whatever goals they may set for themselves. That principle,
in fact, seems to have already been established by the
Indian Self Determination Act of 1976:
The Congress declares that a major national 
goal of the United States is to permit Indians to 
achieve the measure of self-determination 23
essential to their social and economic well-being.
Whether the courts will so expand the basis of Indian water
claims is purely speculation at this time. What does seem
clear, however, is that Indians are not limited to using
their water for agricultural purposes, even though it may
be quantified on that basis. The Supreme Court’s recent
supplemental decree in Arizona vs. California^^ stated that
"the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water
rights (of Indians) shall not constitute a restriction of
the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural 
25application.
The discussion above points to the largest and most 
pressing threat to state water users and administrators in
25 use 450-450n, 1976. See Charles DuMars and 
Helen Ingram, "Congressional Quantification of Indian Reserved 
Water Rights : A Definitive Solution or a Mirage," Natural
Resources Journal 20 (January 1980):3l.
^" 4̂39 US 419, 422 (1979).
^^Cited in Merrill, p. 67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
Montana--the potential consumptive use of large quantities
of reserved water by Indian tribes for the development of
energy resources. In combination with mineral rights,
these water rights make an attractive package for an outside
26developer with capital, or the federal government itself.
In contrast, other federal reserved rights simply do not 
have the potential for such disruptive consumptive uses--at 
issue on federal lands is primarily instream water uses.
The Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission, then, has 
two very different issues before it. Though both are in 
need of resolution, the non-Indian federal reserved rights 
issue can be expected to be less complicated and more easily 
resolved than the Indian issue.
^^Maxfield, et al., p. 207.
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IV. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE--PAST USE 
OF NEGOTIATION TO QUANTIFY 
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
On the surface at least, negotiation would seem to 
be the most suitable method to accommodate the variety of 
conflicting interests involved in water resource planning. 
Legislation has accomplished little of a comprehensive 
nature, and litigation adds exponentially to the cost and 
time involved in planning. Negotiation can allow resolution 
of local conflicts between environment and development 
interests, and between state and federal governments 
without necessarily establishing precedents. In negotiations, 
the focus is on the quantity and form of consideration 
rather than on the fine points of legal argument. The 
parties merely have to agree to do something, and one party 
need not even recognize the authorities under which the 
other claims a right. If a dispute can be settled by 
negotiation, each party retains some control (as well as 
saving time and money). If, on the other hand, bargaining 
fails and the issue goes to court, the result is not always 
controllable by the participants. The court may render a 
decision that may make shambles of the planning efforts 
of the agencies involved.
-27-
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In spite of the apparent advantages of negotiation 
for quantifying federal reserved rights, it has not 
previously been attempted for that purpose on as large a 
scale as the current effort in Montana. It has been 
limited primarily to litigated, or potentially litigated 
cases on a small scale. These negotiations have generally 
involved either scheduled releases of water below dams or 
diversions for instream uses, or Indian participation in 
water resource development projects. For example, in 
December, 1977, the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community 
and the Kennecott Copper Corporation approved an agreement 
to settle a long-standing dispute over their respective 
water rights in Arizona's Gila River watershed. The 
Secretary of Interior, in a news release, stated :
Anyone who has followed western water disputes -- 
particularly in the desert southwest --can only view 
this agreement as a major achievement. I certainly 
commend both parties for reaching a sensible, 
mutually beneficial resolution without costly, 
time-consuming court suits which might also have 
seriously disrupted the state's economy.̂
Though the total number of negotiated agreements
between Indian tribes and other interests is small, they
2have taken a variety of forms. One form is an agreement to 
deferral of a reserved water right. One such settlement
^Cited in Comptroller General's Report, p. C-159.
2"Indian Reserved Water Rights; The Winters of Our 
Discontent," Yale Law Review 88 (July 1979); 1693.
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was reached between the state of Utah and the people of the 
Ute-Ouray reservation. The tribe claimed water rights on 
undeveloped lands susceptible to irrigation. Since the 
lands are not particularly good irrigable acreage, the 
tribe signed an agreement (with the consent of the United 
States) not to develop the lands until the year 2005. That 
in turn will permit the construction of the Bonneville 
Unit of the Central Utah Project. The project will make 
water available for existing and future non-Indian uses, 
without transferring Indian priorities off the reservation. 
These uses will, if things go as planned, be displaced by 
ultimate Indian development. In addition, the Indians did 
obtain immediate construction of some facilities needed to
3use some of their water now.
The Ute agreement illustrates clearly that Indians 
recognize the vast differences between their theoretical 
rights and those that they can expect to achieve immediately. 
They have made large concessions for small gains and many 
promises. It is, for them, painfully true that the right 
to water does not necessarily include a right to the capital 
investment necessary to realize the economic benefits of 
that right. Their bargaining position has been from a 
situation of very limited economic alternatives. The 
agreements achieved, though economically advantageous, may
3Edward W. Clyde, "Special Considerations Involving 
Indian Rights," Natural Resources Lawyer 8 (1975);250.
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be at the cost of weakening the political and cultural 
integrity of the tribe.^
In the case of the Ute agreement, only the future 
will show the wisdom of the concessions that were made. 
Another similar case can be cited to illustrate the hazards 
of negotiating from a weak economic position. It also 
illustrates a second form of possible compromise--that of 
shortage sharing agreements, whereby an early priority date 
is waived when water is insufficient to meet all needs. In 
1962, Congress confirmed a Navajo tribal agreement in which 
federal financing of a massive irrigation project on the 
eastern portion of the reservation (Navajo Indian Irrigation 
Project) was promised in exchange for surrender of the 
Navajo priority to waters needed for the San Juan-Chama 
project. Unfortunately, the main issue for the Indians was 
economics rather than the threat to their water rights--so 
potential Winters rights were not ever a part of their 
bargaining position. Also, to the detriment of the tribe, 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs had a strong role in the 
process --relegating the tribe to ratifiera rather than 
bargainers.^ As a part of the Interior Department, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs undoubtedly was hampered in its
Price and Weatherford, "Indian Water Rights in 
Theory and Practice : Navajo Experience in the Colorado
River Basin,” Law and Contemporary Problems 40 (Winter, 
1976); p. 100.
^Ibid., p. 115.
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role as a negotiator by the unavoidable conflicts of 
interest within the Department.
The decade and a half since the negotiations took 
place have provided a lesson to other tribes that choose 
to bargain with their water rights. Changes in the Navajo 
Indian Irrigation Project threaten to undo the agreement.^ 
Federal financial support for the project has been slow and 
uneven, while the San Juan-Chama project has moved steadily 
to completion. Time has also shown that the bargain had at 
its heart a faulty premise--the desirability of fostering 
small agricultural enterprises in the eastern part of the 
reservation. The tribe has come to realize that their 
economic future lies more with industrial than agricultural 
development. It has been postulated that the lack of 
funding for the project can be attributed to the reduced 
power of the Navajo tribe after its primary bargaining 
advantage (the priority of its Winters rights) had been
7relinquished.
A third type of possible agreement involves waiving 
of Winters rights entirely. Public Law 95-328 authorizes 
the Secretary of Interior to study the feasibility of certain 
water projects providing that the Ak-Chin tribe agrees to
^DuMars and Ingram, p . 22. 
^Price and Weatherford, p. 130.
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Owaive its Winters rights. For that consideration, the
Indians would receive some of the benefits of the development
9and other economic Incentives.
The options discussed above, and perhaps others, 
are available to the Indian tribes In Montana. Some tribes 
are now actively negotiating with the Montana Reserved 
Rights Compact Commission, while others, such as the 
Blackfeet, have so far steadfastly refused. In the case of 
the Indian water rights Issue In Montana, the strength of 
the bargaining position of the parties appears to be largely 
unknown. If the tribes can avoid the pitfalls of the 
Navajos, and there Is every Indication that they will, 
their bargaining position may be quite strong. They are 
doing their own negotiation, with the aid of highly skilled 
consulting attorneys, rather than relying on the federal 
government. Some of the tribes with reservations on 
ancestral lands have the option of using claims for 
aboriginal rights as a point of beginning. All may rely on 
the recent supplemental decree In Arizona vs. California.
O
See U.S. Congress, Certain Water Rights Claims of 
the Ak-Chln Indian Community: Hearings on S 1582 Before
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st 
Session, (1977) .
^"Winters of Our Discontent," p. 1693.
^^Information presented at the Conference on Montana 
Water Resources In Great Falls, Montana (October, 1980) by 
tribal officials and representatives leaves the Impression 
that the Montana tribes have learned a great deal from the 
earlier mistakes of other tribes In approaching negotiations 
with the State of Montana.
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assuring them that their use of water is not limited to 
agriculture. And some, like the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai tribes, have documentation (Hellgate Treaty of 
1855) that reveals the importance of the streams and lakes 
of the reservation to the Indian culture.
^^Veeder, p. 635.
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IV. SOME ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION
Negotiation has been defined as "a process through
which two or more parties try to settle their differences
through give and take, resulting in a resolution of some
conflict between them.” It is characterized by temporary
and voluntary dickering over the division or exchange of
resources (or perhaps more intangible issues). Generally,
it consists of a presentation of demands or proposals by one
party, evaluation by the second party, followed by
concessions or counter-proposals by the second party.
The process is then repeated until a resolution occurs or
negotiations break down.^
Negotiators are, by definition, temporarily
adversaries. A negotiator must be able to place some
reliance on his opponent's information, though he cannot
trust him completely. He must also appear himself to be
frank and open in order to gain his opponent's trust, but he
must at the same time keep his actual intentions as secret 
2as possible. Though built upon an adversary relationship,
Mary Ray White, "Negotiating Instream Flows -- 
Course Materials," USDI, Fish and Wildlife Service (1980),p. 6.
^Ibid., p . 7.
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negotiations, if they are to be successful, must be built on
a foundation of understanding, cooperation, and constructive
3information exchange.
As mentioned earlier, one of the purposes of this 
paper is to explore the potential of the Montana reserved 
rights negotiation process to succeed at its appointed task.
In order to do so, it is necessary to attempt to define some 
of the elements required (or desirable) for a successful 
negotiated settlement to occur. From the literature cited 
previously, (and the author's experience in purchasing 
homes, automobiles, and assorted animals through negotiation), 
the following list was developed :
1) All interested groups must be recognized and 
accepted.
2) Each party must be able to expect to gain something, 
through compromise, that they could not expect to 
readily gain otherwise.
3) The negotiators must be qualified and have the 
authority to compromise. The parties must be able 
to reasonably expect that the compromise will not 
be overturned (or overruled) by another party.
4) The balance of power between the parties must not 
be overwhelmingly lopsided.
3Wassenberg, Olive, Demott, and Stolnaker, "Elements 
in Negotiating Stream Flows Associated with Federal Projects," 
USD I, Fish and Wildlife Service Report #FWS/DBS-70/03,
August 1979.
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5) Each side must be able to acquire enough information 
about the other side's needs and preferences to make
a good guess of the lowest offer the other side
will accept.
6) The parties must be aware of the costs of stalemate 
and time limits for reaching a settlement.
Although there are other necessary elements, those listed 
above raise questions pertinent to the Montana situation.
The eventual outcome of the process will in large part
depend on the extent to which these elements are satisfied.
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VI. MONTANA'S NEGOTIATION PROCESS-- 
ARE THE ELEMENTS PRESENT?
The 1979 Montana legislature established the Montana 
Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission to interface Indian 
and federal reserved water rights with the statewide 
adjudication process, also passed in 1979. The success of 
each is dependent on the other--if one collapses, the other 
does too. In the nearly two years that the adjudication 
process has been in existence, it has often been vigorously 
criticized by business interests as a waste of time and 
money. Industrial interests, in particular, have advocated 
the repeal of the 1979 amendments, or the entire Water Use 
Act. New, large scale water users such as energy development 
industries would benefit most by a return to the chaotic 
water rights system that existed in Montana prior to 1973--it 
is difficult to deny new water permit requests without any, 
or with inadequate, information concerning present use 
levels. Appealing to the natural mistrust of government by 
the small farmer and rancher, big business has campaigned 
hard to convince them that the adjudication process somehow 
jeopardizes their current and future uses of Montana water. 
The 1981 Montana legislative session will undoubtedly see
-37-
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an organized effort to scuttle the adjudication process--and 
perhaps the Reserved Rights Compact Commission along with
it.i
Assuming for the moment that the process survives,
its success will depend to a large degree on whether or not
the requisite elements of negotiation, as discussed in the
previous section, are present. Since the negotiation
2process is expected to take several years, and is now only 
in its very early stages, it is difficult to predict the 
problems that the Commission will encounter. More uncertain 
still are the situations that may arise if an agreement 
is reached and sent to the Montana legislature and United 
States Congress for ratification. Some predictions can, 
however, be made with the information that is available now.
Question #1--Are all interested groups recognized and 
accepted?
At first glance, it would appear that the parties 
to the negotiations are three--state and federal 
governments and the Indian tribes. Obviously, each is 
recognized as having a stake in water resource planning 
and management in Montana. Government officials, though, 
are not the real parties to the bargaining--they merely 
represent most of the actual parties. The struggle for
18 August 1980.
^Ibid.
^Henry Loble, personal communication, Helena, Montana, 
1 Q«n
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equitable shares of Montana’s water is really between 
business and agricultural interests, Indian tribes, 
consumers, recreationists, and environmental activists 
(to name a few). The role of government officials 
should be to enforce the "law of the land," rather than
3to become advocates for one side or the other. 
Unfortunately, that distinction blurs easily when the 
topic of discussion is water rights. State authorities, 
for example, are responsible not only for enforcing 
state laws, but also for upholding the Constitution and 
federal law. It is a mistake, then, to characterize 
the negotiations in Montana as being strictly between 
the two levels of government.
As pointed out earlier, the federal government has 
not often adequately represented the interests of the 
Indian people in its capacity as trustee. The states 
have an even more dismal record--there is much evidence 
of the hostility of state administrative agencies and 
courts to Indians and their rights.^ Indian tribes are 
best represented in the negotiation process by them­
selves --as distinct, independent, sovereign (subject to 
the Constitution), political communities.
3Pelcyger, p. 756.
^For a detailed discussion of this evidence, see 
Pelcyger, pp. 747-751.
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The composition of the Montana Reserved Water Rights 
Commission seems to support a hypothesis that business 
and agricultural interests will receive strong support 
on the state end of the bargaining table. Its chairman, 
Henry Loble, has spent many years representing business 
interests as an attorney specializing in water law.
For those familiar with water politics in Montana, a 
quick glance at the composition of the rest of the
5See Appendix A for a list of Commission members.
^In this context, 'environmental concerns' refers to 
natural resource management rather than environmental 
preservation.
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Commission reveals an obvious eastern slope agricultural ~
5bent. Only two of the members, Senator Steve Brown :
(Helena) and Representative Daniel Kemmis (Missoula), ;
might be said to represent urban and/or western Montana :
views on water resource management. :
Federal agencies, depending on their missions and :
the purposes of the reservation involved, represent many *,
of the groups not obviously represented by the Compact 
Commission. For example, the National Park Service, 
and the Forest Service represent primarily recreational, 
wildlife and environmental concerns.̂  The Water and 
Power Service (formally Bureau of Reclamation) and the 
Corps of Engineers, on the other hand, are primarily 
concerned with providing water storage for crops, power 
and flood control. Most interest groups are represented
41
to some degree by one or more of the agencies involved.
If the Commission succeeds in its preferred approach 
--i.e., negotiating with each Indian tribe and federal 
agency more or less independently--there is reason to 
believe that most, if not all, interested groups will be 
recognized, accepted, and represented to some degree in 
the process. The probable exception might be anyone 
advocating non-use of the water (leave it where it is 
because it is there). Even in Montana, with energy 
development sure to explode, there is not likely to be 
much unused water leaving the borders in the future.
Question #2--Can the parties expect to gain something, 
through compromise, that they could not 
expect to reach otherwise?
The fact that most potential participants in the 
Montana negotiations have expressed a willingness to 
enter the process suggests that they perceive a chance 
to gain. For Montana, elimination of uncertainty is 
one of the primary goals. Secondary goals probably 
include savings in time and money in the adjudication 
process. The Indian tribes are divided on the wisdom of 
negotiation. The Northern Cheyenne position is that, 
realistically, they cannot expect to gain all that they 
believe due them--so the sooner quantification takes
7Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana, 
18 August, 1980.
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place, the more water is likely to be available to them. 
They are, therefore, willing to compromise now. The 
Blackfoot tribe, on the other hand, believes that their 
legal position is such that they stand to gain nothing, 
but lose much, by compromise. They have, consequently,
orefused to negotiate with the Commission.
Earlier, President Carter's water policy initiatives 
regarding federal reserved water rights were characterized 
as a compromise position--the federal government is 
committed not to continue to seek the broadest 
theoretical extension of its water rights. Negotiation 
is encouraged. Yet, the policy statement and its accom­
panying Executive directives did little to guide the 
agencies toward the solution of some of the major issues.
9Several large questions were left unanswered:
1) how will reserved rights be administered, and 
by whom?
2) what standards should federal agencies use in 
determining quantities of water associated with 
their reserved rights?
3) how will judicial review be obtained?
QThe Indian positions were presented by tribal 
representatives at the Conference on Montana Water Resources, 
Great Falls, Montana, October 1980.
^Hillhouse and Hannay , "Practical Implications of 
the New National Water Policy," Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute 25 (1979): Ch. 22, p. 48.
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4) will established water uses which are disrupted 
by the exercise of heretofore unused federal 
reserved rights be compensated?
The Report of the Federal Task Force of Non-Indian 
Reserved Rights made some recommendations toward 
resolving these and other issues. In addition, an 
interagency working group has recently been established 
to study and make recommendations relating to the 
quantification aspects of the Task Force Report.
Until there is some clearer and more precise national 
direction, from the President or Congress, it will be 
difficult for the federal agencies to define the limits 
within which they may compromise. A willingness to 
compromise does not necessarily imply the ability to do 
so.
From the State side come conflicting signs. The 
establishment of the Commission was a positive move in 
the direction of compromise. At the same time, however. 
State water policy officials have been lending support 
to the proposed Roe bill ("Reserved Water Rights 
Coordination Act of 1980")^^--a proposal that would, in
U.S., Office of Water Data Coordination, "Draft 
Charter--Interagency Advisory Committee on Water Data,"
June, 1980.
^^Gary Fritz (Administrator, Water Resources Division, 
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation), personal 
interview, Helena, Montana, 7 July 1980.
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effect, leave the states holding most of the cards if it 
is ever enacted into law.
Another large question mark concerning the willing­
ness of the State interests to compromise involves the 
diverse political and philosophical composition of the 
Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission. So 
far, the Commission has no formal procedural and 
operational bylaws established to define its decision 
making process. Neither does the legislative charter S
establish any such bylaws. As yet, the Commission's
Chairman does not know whether a simple majority or
unanimous consent will be required for determining the
12Commission's bargaining position. That simple 
administrative detail could make all the difference in 
determining the effectiveness of the effort. For 
example, in considering federal instream flow claims, 
it could be of considerable importance that one of the 
Commissioners, Senator Jack Galt, led the fight in the 
1979 Montana legislature to eliminate the State's own 
instream flow reservation statute.
Question #3--Do the negotiators have the authority to 
compromise? Can the parties reasonably 
expect that the compromise will not be 
overturned (or overruled) by another party?
18 August 1980.
12Henry Loble, personal interview, Helena, Montana,
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At this early stage of negotiation, there are many
questions and few answers concerning what might follow
a future agreement between the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Commission and an Indian tribe or agency of the
federal government. By law, any agreement must be
ratified by the Montana Legislature and the United
13States Congress. Due in part to the novelty of the 
approach, there is little information upon which to 
base any serious speculation as to what might happen 
in either forum. Undoubtedly, politicians at both 
levels will need to be continually informed of progress 
toward reaching a settlement. The public, too, will 
need to be informed so that any agreement does not 
come as an unpleasant surprise to any politically active 
segment thereof.
Because the Montana process is unique and potentially 
precedent setting, the federal bureaucracy is proceeding 
cautiously. To date, it is operating with no clear 
Congressional or Executive direction to guide its 
efforts. At the insistence of the MRWRCC, the Secretar­
ies of Defense, Agriculture and Interior have each 
designated official representatives to the negotiation--a 
process that consumed several months in the early part 
of 1980.^^ These representatives have been given no
^&CA 85-2-702.
^'^Daniel Kemmis (Member, MRWRCC) , personal communica­
tion, Missoula, Montana, 14 August 1980.
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communication, Missoula, Montana, 29 September 1980.
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decision-making authority, so their effectiveness as
negotiators will be limited by their ability to gain
approval of their positions (or definition of their
department's position), in a timely and orderly manner.
Nor is it even clear whose approval is needed (i.e.,
does each Secretary have full negotiating authority?).
Assuming that the federal representatives are not
hampered by lack of support and/or guidance within their
Department, another unknown is the role that the ^
Department of Justice will play in the process. To date, :
Justice lawyers have assumed a "wait and see" attitude -- i:'
that is, they are monitoring the process but taking no '-t
15active role in it. Presumably, they would be involved ;
at least in an advisory role to the President and/or the 
Congress during the ratification process.
If the Justice Department functions only to define 
the legal limits of the possible agreements, there may 
be no cause for concern by those interested in a quick 
negotiated settlement. There is cause for concern, 
however, if the Justice Department takes an active role 
in attempting to define a specific and uniform federal 
position, and overly concern themselves with the 
possibility that some legal precedent may be set in the 
negotiation process. The draft Task Force 5a report
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points out numerous examples of the relative inflexibil­
ity of the Justice Department in situations that might 
compromise I or diminish, the traditional federal water 
claims. For example :
1) The Justice Department recommended deletion of a 
Task Force recommendation that "all federal water 
rights once quantified and adjudicated should, as 
a practical matter, be subject to administration 
by the states.
2) The Justice Department did not support the Task 
Force recommendation that the United States should 
participate in state administrative (adjudication) 
proceedings whenever the interests of the United 
States can be adequately protected. (Instead, the 
Justice alternative maintains that the United States 
can only be a party to a judicial proceeding after 
being served under the provisions of the McCarren 
Amendment).
It seems likely that more and quicker progress will 
result if the various federal agencies (or Departments) 
and Indian tribes are allowed to negotiate separate 
(and perhaps different) agreements, with minimum active
^^Task Force 5a Report (draft), p. 63.
17Ibid., pp. 59-60. The McCarren Amendment waives 
the sovereign immunity of the United States against lawsuits 
in the case of general judicial adjudication proceedings.
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participation by the Department of Justice.
Returning to the state perspective, the MRWRCC 
clearly has the authority to negotiate a proposal to 
settle the federal water rights question. It is not 
clear precisely how such a compact, once ratified by 
both parties, would interface with the statewide 
general adjudication process. The enabling statute 
provides that the contents of any compact shall be 
Included in the preliminary decree (of a general 
adjudication proceeding) "whether or not it has been 
ratified by Congress. Section 85-2-234 (MCA) states 
that "the water judge shall, on the basis of the 
preliminary decree and on the basis of any hearing that 
may have been held, enter a final decree affirming or 
modifying (emphasis added) the preliminary decree.
The statutes in combination appear to imply that the 
terms of a ratified compact might be modified by the 
District (water) judge in an adjudication proceeding.
Though the chances of such an eventuality are considered
19 20remote by members of the Commission and their staff,
it could be considered to jeopardize the realization of
^%CA 85-2-231
19Henry Loble, personal communication, Helena, 
Montana, 18 August 1980. Daniel Kemmis, personal communica­
tion, Missoula, Montana, 14 August 1980.
20Scott Brown, personal communication, Missoula, 
Montana, 30 September 1980,
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some of the Federal government's (and Indians’) primary 
purposes for negotiating--to avoid the time, expense, 
and uncertainties associated with state judicial 
determination of their water rights.
Question #4--Is the balance of power between the parties 
overwhelmingly lopsided?
Recent history has strengthened considerably the
bargaining position of the State of Montana in dealing
with the federal reserved water rights. The McCarren
Amendment (43 USC 666) waived the sovereign immunity
of the United States in proceedings initiated in State
21courts for the adjudication of water rights. It
established concurrent jurisdiction in both state and
federal courts over federal reserved rights. At first,
the parameters and requirements which the state systems
needed to meet to adjudicate the United States’
reserved rights were not clearly defined. But recent
22Supreme Court decisions have favored the State of
Colorado's position that state courts, rather than
federal, should quantify federal reserved rights :
Although the Court technically did not 
abolish federal concurrent jurisdiction over
^^Task Force 5a Report (Draft), p. 57.
22United States vs. District Court for Water Div.
No . 5 [401 US 527-(197Ï) I ; United States vs. District Court. 
for Fagle.County [401 US 520 C19/1)1: Colorado River Water Conservation District, vs. United States'T4'24'"'U5̂ R̂nn ( 19761] .
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reserved water rights claims, the opinion reaches 
this result in effect by dictating federal 
dismissal in deferrence to the state forum in 
virtually every case where a comprehensive state 
system exists for adjudication of water rights.
In practical terms, Colorado River means that 
most, if not all, future court adjudications of 
federal reserved water rights will occur in
state courts.23
In Montana, the new statewide adjudication procedure 
has been patterned after that existing in Colorado to 
enable Montana to begin adjudications involving Indian 
and federal reserved water rights. In an effort to test 
the Montana adjudication process, the U.S. Justice 
Department filed four suits in U.S. District Court 
(April, 1979) to adjudicate the rights of the tribes on 
the Fort Peck, Flathead, Rocky Boy's and Fort Belknap 
Reservations. On November 26, 1979, U.S. District Judges 
Battin and Hatfield dismissed all of the suits, 
preferring to have the rights adjudicated in state 
court, and citing the Colorado River decision.
The importance of these developments cannot be over­
emphasized. Combined with the President's "reasonable 
standard" language in his water policy initiatives, they 
seem to lift the state's bargaining position above the 
federal. Because of the close relationship between
Abrams, p. 1126.
^^Robert D . Dellwo, "Recent Developments in the 
Northwest Regarding Indian Water Rights," Natural Resources 
Journal 20 (January 1980); 113.
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water rights and economic development, Montana has
strong reasons to construe the scope of federal and
Indian reserved rights as narrowly as possible. State
courts will have a tendency to do so because of the
inherent conflict between reserved rights and the prior
appropriation system.
Another significant development, again in the United
States Supreme Court, was the decision in United States
25vs. New Mexico. The court limited Forest Service 
water use under the federal reserved water rights 
doctrine through a very narrow interpretation of the 
legislation establishing the National Forest system.
The court held that the United States reserved only 
such water as is necessary for the preservation (and 
growth) of timber and "securance of favorable water- 
flows." It also ruled that, although the Multiple 
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 was intended to broaden 
the purposes for which national forests are managed, it 
was not meant to reserve additional water with a 
priority date of 1897. That decision also serves to 
buttress the state's bargaining position, particularly
^^98  S. C t .  8012 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
9 AGeorge S. Young, "Reserved Water Rights on National 
Forests after United States vs. New Mexico," Utah Law Review, 
1979:609, 610.
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as it relates to instream uses of water on Federal
lands
Question #5--What are the needs and realities that will 
define the lowest offer each side will 
likely accept?
From the state perspective, by far the most pressing 
need is for quantification and prioritization of federal 
and Indian water rights. As pointed out earlier, state 
water planning and administration is threatened with 
chaos until the responsible agencies can determine how 
much water is left for appropriation under state law.
For that reason, the state is unlikely to agree to any 
settlement that will leave either existing or future 
reserved rights unquantified (at least to some realistic 
level of accuracy) within a certain, relatively short, 
time period. To do so, they will probably insist that 
the right to use reserved water in the future, if not 
quantified and agreed upon in the settlement, be 
foreclosed--or at least strictly regulated by the state.
Similarly, any future water right needed for the 
federal government on existing reservations not covered 
by the agreement will be obtained under state law and
27On Indian lands, on the other hand, a recent ruling 
by a federal appeals court in Colville Confederated Tribes 
vs. Walton may have broadened the scope of Indian reserved 
rights. While the court found that an instream right for 
fish propagation "will not be implied at this time,” it 
left the door open for such uses under the implied reserva­
tion doctrine.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
procedures. In establishing priority dates, the state
will probably Insist that no existing state-authorized
water user be Injured, unless fairly compensated, by
existing or future exercise of federal rights. Thirdly,
the state will likely not give up Its prerogative to
adjudicate all water rights within Its boundaries In
state courts, Including federal and Indian rights under
the McCarren Amendment. Once quantified and adjudicated,
the state will probably wish to administer all rights
28within Its borders --at least to some extent.
The federal "bottom line" will likely Include the 
following :
1) Preservation of the prerogative of Congress to 
establish new federal or Indian reserved rights, 
either on new reservations or by expressly changing 
the purposes of existing reservations.
2) Preservation of the right of the federal judiciary 
to adjudicate federal or Indian rights where 
manifest unfairness to federal Interests would 
result If adjudicated In state court.
3) Maintenance of sufficient flexibility In quantifying 
and administering Indian reserved rights to allow
2RIt Is possible that Montana might relinquish some 
degree of administrative control over some types of federal 
rights to avoid the costs and manpower needs associated with 
administering them. For example, the state might be willing 
to negotiate a set of limits within which Indian tribes or federal agencies could be free to change the type of use, 
point of use, quantity or other aspect of certain water rights.
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federal trust responsibilities toward Indians to 
be carried out.
4) A mechanism for the federal government to obtain 
sufficient water to carry out its Congressionally- 
authorized management functions, even if state law 
does not adequately recognize these functions as 
legitimate beneficial water uses. For example, on 
certain federal lands, water is needed to protect 
recreational, fish, wildlife, and esthetic values 
and to maintain aquatic or riparian ecosystems-- 
though such uses may not be expressly identified as 
purposes of the reservation.
The Indian "bottom line" position is a little harder 
to define specifically--and will likely vary between 
the tribes. The tribes must ensure that their reserva­
tions have sufficient water to allow them to become 
viable economic and social entities. In addition, 
cultural and spiritual considerations may well be points 
considered non-negotiable by some tribes.
It is the author’s opinion that the parties will be 
unwilling to sacrifice the points discussed above to a 
negotiated settlement. The potential "solution space" 
or "middle-ground” between these two hypothetical 
bottom-line positions is extremely large, so there 
should be no barrier to settlement associated with these 
positions. Of course, if either party chooses to take a
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more rigid stand, the chances for settlement may well 
decrease accordingly.
Question #6--What are the costs of stalemate and the time 
limits for reaching a settlement?
The Montana Supreme Court has issued an order under 
MCA 85-2-212 requiring that all Montana water users 
file a claim with the Department of Natural Resources 
and Conservation by January 1, 1982 for all water rights 
initiated prior to the passage of the Water Use Act of 
1973. Presumably, that order applies to federal agencies 
and Indian tribes as well. Since most exercised federal 
and Indian rights predate 1973 in priority, the law 
appears to require that many of the rights to be 
negotiated through the Compact Commission must also be 
filed by the 1982 deadline, or face being presumed 
abandoned in accordance with MCA 85-2-227. That require­
ment not only places a severe time constraint on the 
negotiation process (since the basis for establishing 
existing rights is still being negotiated), but also 
requires that federal agencies and Indian tribes 
divide their manpower and dollars to a certain extent 
to meet both requirements. MCA 85-2-217 suspends general 
actions to adjudicate federal or Indian reserved rights 
until July 1, 1982 while the Compact negotiations are 
still on-going.
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In contrast to the state timetable, the (draft)
Task Force 5a report estimated that it might take up to
five years to quantify current consumptive uses of
water, and up to ten years to quantify actual
non-consumptive uses and reasonable foreseeable future
29consumptive uses. The report attributes much of the 
time difference to the lack of well established 
methodologies for establishing the latter types of uses. 
In most cases involving non-consumptive uses, the 
existing methodologies are very site-specific in 
nature, and depend on the collection of considerable 
hydrological and biological data. In order for the 
federal government to meet the existing state imposed 
filing and negotiation deadlines, new (and less 
site-specific) procedures will need to be applied. The 
lack of precision associated with such methodologies 
will need to be recognized by both sides.
In Montana, the costs of stalemate are difficult to 
assess. Unlike past situations where negotiation has 
been successful, there is no particular water project 
being jeopardized by the threat of an unproductive set 
of negotiations. The crisis point has not yet been 
reached. The concept of statewide negotiations could 
probably be written off as a good, but unworkable, idea
29Task Force 5a Report (draft); pp. 38, 39.
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if it failed. But, a return to the situation as it 
existed prior to establishment of the Compact Commission 
would mean a continuation of the adversary roles played 
in the courts for so long (and for so little) by the 
parties. Tension would undoubtedly increase. The 
statewide adjudication process would not go nearly as 
smoothly as it would if agreements could be reached. 
Expensive and time consuming litigation would likely 
be the end result. Long delays would increase the 
possibility that the exercise of federal reserved rights 
in the future would impair water rights vested under 
state law.
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VII. NON-CONSUMPTIVE WATER USES ON NATIONAL FORESTS
A . Backgroijnd
On an individual basis, before negotiations can 
begin in earnest, it will be necessary for the Indian tribe 
or federal agency involved to establish whether there is 
anything to be gained by their participation in the process. 
If the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission 
fails completely to recognize as legitimate any of the 
"bottom line" federal or Indian positions (discussed in the 
previous section), it would not pay for the federal govern­
ment or the tribes to dedicate the dollars and manpower 
necessary to pursue the negotiations. For the U.S.D.A. 
Forest Service, that determination will be based in large 
part on the willingness of the Commission to recognize 
non-consumptive water uses on the national forests as 
legitimate federal rights. Consumptive water uses^ comprise 
such a small percentage of Forest Service uses (much less 
than 1%) that there would be, for all practical purposes, 
nothing to negotiate if non-consumptive rights are not
Consumptive water uses are those in which water is 
removed from the water body, used (consumed) for some 
purpose, and consequently not returned for reuse.
5 8 -
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2recognized. That situation is not expected to change much 
in the future (in contrast to the situation on Indian reser­
vations) .
One school of thought (often held by state water 
administrators) maintains that the concept of non-consumptive 
(or instream) water rights has no place in the West--where 
a right is based upon an appropriation, which is, in turn, 
based upon a diversion for beneficial use:
A[n] instream flow is not an ordinary usufructory 
interest in property, that is, where water is diverted 
from nature's design and utilized or made serviceable 
by man for his design. Quite the contrary, [such 
claims] are not water rights at all, but simple 
exercise of governmental dominion over water that 
prevents its usufructory enjoyment.^
The other point of view recognizes the property 
interest of the public in general toward maintaining some 
water within the stream or lake. The public trust respon­
sibilities of the Forest Service require the agency to 
defend that public interest. To understand the basis for 
that Forest Service position, it will be necessary to briefly 
discuss the history of the national forest system in the 
United States.
The Creative Act of 1891'̂  authorized the President
2Ronald L. Russell (Regional Hydrologist, Forest 
Service, Missoula, MT), personal communication, 10 October 
1980.
^Simms, p. 15.
^26 Stat. 1103; 16 USC 471.
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to create national forest reserves by withdrawing them from 
the public domain. As discussed previously, Congress also 
implied reserved water in sufficient quantities to fulfill 
the purposes for which the national forests were established. 
The Organic Administration Act of 1897^ detailed the purposes 
of the national forests s
No national forest shall be established, except 
to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries 
or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions 
of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of 
timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the 
United States.
In 1960, Congress supplemented, or clarified, its 
statement of purposes by passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained 
Yield Act.̂  The Act states that "it is the policy of 
Congress that the national forests are established and shall 
be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, 
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” Based in part 
upon both pieces of legislation, the Forest Service has 
historically claimed sufficient water under the implied 
reservation doctrine so that "minimum stream and lake levels 
(are) adequate to insure the continued nutrition, growth, 
conservation, and reproduction of fish and to preserve the 
recreational, scenic, and esthetic conditions of the riparian
^30 Stat. 34; 16 USC 473.
^74 Stat. 215; 16 USC 528-531.
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corridors. Collectively, these purposes have come to be 
called "instream" water uses --or non-consumptive uses that 
require no physical diversion of water from the stream, 
lake or aquifer. Until recently, the United States has 
claimed a priority date for instream water uses as the date 
each national forest was reserved from the public domain-- 
normally an excellent priority date in most parts of the 
western U.S. (usually before the turn of the century).
The 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision in United
OStates vs. New Mexico has caused the Forest Service to 
re-examine its reserved water claims for most non-consumptive 
uses. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court narrowly construed 
the purposes of the national forests to include only the 
protection and production of timber, and "securing favorable 
conditions of water flows." It concluded that the United 
States did not have a reserved right for esthetic, 
recreational, wildlife preservation and stock watering 
purposes on the Gila National Forest based upon the Organic 
Administration Act. The court also held that, although the 
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 was intended to 
broaden the purposes for which national forests are managed,
7Master Referee's Final Report, Case-in-Chief: Claims
of the United States covering water rights with the State of 
Colorado--Water Divisions 4. 5. and 6 . Cited in R. Scott 
Fifer, "Water Law and National Forest Management," unpublished 
term paper, Colorado State University (April, 1980), p. 14.
^98 S. C t . 3012 (1978). Commonly referred to as the Rio Mimbres decision.
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it was not meant to reserve additional water with a priority 
of 1897.^
This decision is often cited by state officials^^ 
as clear evidence that the federal government has no 
non-consumptive water rights unless they are obtained 
through state processes and under state law. There are, 
however, a number of reasons why a strict, literal 
interpretation of the New Mexico decision might not be in 
the best interests of the state as a "given" in the 
negotiation process.
B . The Nature of the Conflict
First, such a position would be predicated on the 
assumption that there is, indeed, a significant conflict 
or potential conflict between Forest Service instream water 
uses and state authorized uses. Yet, there is much evidence 
to indicate that, in Montana at least, such conflict is far 
more imagined than real. Because of the location of national 
forest land--i.e., high in the watershed, above most private 
lands --Forest Service instream rights would, in most cases, 
help insure delivery of water to downstream users. In the
QYoung, p. 615.
^^Gary Fritz (Administrator, Water Resources Division, 
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation), 
personal interview, 7 July 1980. See Simms for a "state 
view" of the meaning of the New Mexico decision and the impacts it should have on national water policy.
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words of one observer, “59% of the total water (produced in 
the eleven coterminous western states) flows from national 
forest and national park reservations [and] [u]ntll the law 
of gravity Is amended or repealed, most of that water Is 
likely to continue to flow."^^ On the other hand, there will 
be a few Instances where either existing or future state 
authorized uses may be precluded or Interrupted by federal 
Instream rights. There Is an urgent need to Identify such 
conflicts now, at least preliminarily, to speed the adjudi­
cation process. The negotiation process offers a unique 
degree of flexibility In solving such conflicts, by allowing 
agreements on shortage sharing, flexibility in assigning 
priority dates, or providing for just compensation to the 
Injured party. A strict Interpretation of the New Mexico 
decision, by precluding negotiation with the Forest Service, 
would forego the opportunity to Identify and solve the few 
conflicts that will exist, without resorting to expensive and 
time consuming litigation.
In defining the State's position, It will also be 
Important for Montana officials to keep In mind the signifi­
cant differences between Montana and New Mexico water rights 
situations. In New Mexico, there Is no recognition of recre­
ation, fish and wildlife as beneficial uses of water--there 
Is too little water to give such uses any legitimacy In many 
areas of the state. Most, If not all, streams and rivers In
^^Corker, p. 584.
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New Mexico are already over-appropriated. In Montana, where 
unappropriated water still exists, the law wisely recognizes 
the importance of instream water uses to the state and its 
people. MCA 85-2-316 authorizes the state or any agency of 
the United States to apply to the Board of Natural Resources 
and Conservation to reserve waters to "maintain a minimum 
flow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at 
such periods or for such length of time as the board desig­
nates." Because of the existence of that law, the state 
could argue that federal instream flow rights are unnecessary. 
However, a close examination reveals that quantification of 
federal reserved rights is needed to strengthen the state 
instream reservations.
There are at least two major reasons why the state 
reservation process, as it now exists, cannot adequately sub­
stitute for federal instream rights on national forest land:
1) The state water reservation process will likely 
take a minimum of 15-20 years to complete. In the interim, 
the day-to-day administration of water use applications, 
and the upcoming general adjudications, recognize no other 
environmental considerations. Instream users apparently 
have no legitimate claim to water until a reservation is 
granted by DNRC under existing state laws. In contrast to 
most other western states, Montana does not have a "public 
interest" requirement for issuance of a water use permit.
Such requirements, in other states, usually allow the water 
rights administrator to reject an application for a water
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use permit If it unreasonably conflicts with the "public
interest." The result of this situation in Montana is that, 
if a permit request poses no threat of injury to established
diversionary water rights (in river basins where instream
reservations have not been made) , state law allows no
I Tdiscretion--the DNRC must issue the permit.
2) Since the instream flow reservations were granted
for the Yellowstone River by the Board of Natural Resources
and Conservation (Dec. 1978), the state instream reservation
process has been under attack by business and agricultural
interests. In the 1979 legislative session, Senator Jack
Galt (a member of the MRWRCC) introduced a bill into the
state senate to eliminate instream reservations altogether.
Though that bill failed, another one passed--which provided
among other things, that instream flows are limited to
50% of the average annual stream flow. That limitation would
provide insufficient protection to many headwater streams on
national forest land. The legislative history serves to
illustrate the vulnerability of the state instream flow
reservation process to modification or possible elimination
13by de-authorizing legislation. Based solely on state 
legislation, instream rights on national forest land would 
have no certainty of tenure.
12For additional information, see Eagle and Russell,
pp. 11, 12.
13For more on the 1979 Montana Legislature's 
treatment of the state instream flow law, see Eagle and Russell, pp. 9-13.
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Federal instream rights, if recognized by compact 
and subsequently incorporated into the state instream 
reservation process, could eliminate or significantly 
diminish the two problems discussed above. Once a compact 
is signed, federal instream rights can immediately be 
Incorporated into the permit granting and adjudication 
processes without waiting for the state reservation process 
to reach its conclusion. Such federal rights would not be 
subject to elimination by state legislative action.
If held jointly with state wildlife and water quality 
agencies under the state reservation process, federal 
reserved rights would strengthen the state's position in 
protecting instream values in a large percentage of the 
state's prime aquatic habitat and recreational waters.
C . Weaknesses of the New Mexico Decision
The several weaknesses of the New Mexico decision 
itself provide additional arguments against its use to 
define the limits of the state negotiating position. There 
is an important distinction to be drawn between the Supreme 
Court's approach (in New Mexico) and the approach now 
possible through the negotiation process*.
The key to the analysis should not depend on a 
search of archaic legislative history. Rather, it 
should depend on an equitable balancing of the 
present needs and benefits of the federal reservation
If state ratification of a compact were revoked, 
such revocation would, however, render the agreement null 
and void.
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with the state’s desire for preÆctability and the 
expectations of private appropriâtors under the 
law.
The first weakness of the New Mexico decision Is Its 
failure to consider the purposes of the national forest as 
now perceived. By limiting itself to the wording of the 
1897 Organic Administration Act, the decision Ignores a 
substantial body of subsequent legislation that broadens 
the original purposes and the management objectives of the 
Forest Service. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act (i960), 
the National Forest Management Act (1976) and the Wild and 
Scenic River Act (1968) are all good examples of explicit 
pieces of legislation that belle the Court's apparent 
determination that "most national forests . . . are not 
forests In the common meaning of the term, but are more In 
the nature of tree farms. Strictly Interpreted, New 
Mexico clearly limits national forest reserved rights 
acquired between 1897 and 1960 to the purposes In the 1897 
Act. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion In the case points 
out that, although the Court In the majority opinion 
"purports to hold that passage of the 1960 (Multiple Use
16Michael Wrenn, "Water Law--Quantification of 
Water Rights Claimed under the Implied Reservation Doctrine 
for National Forests--United States vs. New Mexico,
438 US 696 (1978)," Washington Law Review 54 (Oct. 1979) 
875.
"Supreme Court Strikes New Balance In Federal- State Tension Over Western Water Rights," Environmental Law Reporter. Vol. 8, No. 9, (Sept. 1978), p. 10182.
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Act) did not have the effect of reserving any additional 
water in existing forests, . . . this portion of its opinion 
appears to be d i c t a . A s  such, the question is open for 
additional judicial deliberation in future cases, if 
necessary. A reasonable interpretation of the language of 
the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act would be that Congress 
desired to keep its 1897 priority for the original purposes 
outlined in the Organic Administration Act, and at the same 
time obtain reserved rights for additional purposes (fish, 
wildlife, recreation, etc.), with a priority of 1960. The 
active role of Congress in making appropriations for the 
purposes outlined in the 1960 act, and subsequent legislation, 
strongly indicate that Congress did indeed intend for the 
national forests to be managed for purposes other than 
growing trees and transmitting water downstream. Though, 
in many areas of the west, a 1960 priority date would be 
virtually worthless --it would be far better than a future 
state instream reservation in Montana.
The argument outlined above assumes that the Multiple 
Use Act supplemented the purposes of Congress in authorizing 
the establishment of national forests. There is considerable
98 S. C t . 3023, cited in Young, p. 616. The 
legal term, "dicta” means an observation or remark made by 
a judge in pronouncing an opinion, but not necessarily 
involved in the case or essential to its determination.
Such opinions lack the force of adjudication, as they are 
considered not to be the professed, deliberate determinations 
of the judge.
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evidence to indicate that by passage of the Act, Congress
1 omerely clarified its policies. There is much to suggest
that Congress has always desired that national forests be
managed as viable, balanced ecosystems. The language of
the Organic Act, in addition to the tree and water production
mandates, also clearly charges the Forest Service with
19improving and protecting the national forests. In the
New Mexico case, the Forest Service had argued that such
protection constituted a third purpose, within which instream
uses would logically fall. The four dissenting justices
agreed, saying:
. . . the forests consist of the birds, animals, and 
fish--the wildlife--that inhabit them, as well as the 
trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses. [We] therefore 
would hold that the United States is entitled to so 
much as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the 
forests, as well as the plants.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the National
Forest Management Act of 1976 and numerous Executive Orders
pertaining to the protection of aquatic and riparian
habitats all reinforce this position. In the New Mexico
case, then, the Supreme Court appears to have seriously
misconstrued the original purposes of the National Forests.
18Wengert, Dyer, and Deutsch. "The Purposes of the 
National Forests--A Historical Re-interprétâtion of Policy 
Development." A Report to the U.S. Forest Service pursuant 
to contract by Colorado State University, Fort Collins, 
Colorado. January 1979.
^^See quotation, p. 60 , from Organic Act.
^^Cited in Sally Fairfax and Dan Tarlock, p. 533.
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If the decision stands as a definitive judgment on the 
extent of reserved rights, it will be necessary in some 
cases for water to be obtained for these purposes by other 
means such as condemnation, purchase, special use permit 
or easement clauses, or perhaps even through the judicious 
application of the "non-reserved" federal rights concept 
articulated by the U.S.D.l. Solicitor.
Another weakness of the New Mexico decision is its 
failure to recognize other consumptive uses (in addition 
to timber growth) as legitimate on national forest land.
The Forest Service has always believed that it possessed 
reserved water rights for fostering economic benefits for 
both the locality and the Nation as a whole. Legislative 
history supports the use of reserved water for public 
recreation, grazing, mining and other consumptive uses.
Many special use and grazing permittees using national 
forest land have relied upon Forest Service water rights in 
lieu of making application for the rights themselves under 
state law. Fortunately, in Montana (unlike most other 
western states), the Forest Service may still file on such 
rights and perhaps have them adjudicated as "use rights" 
if established prior to 1973. However, those individuals 
establishing uses after that time, for which they believed 
a Forest Service right existed, should not be penalized for 
that assumption.
^^Solicitor's Opinion # M36914.
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VIII. A PROPOSAL--TOWARD DEFINING A 
"MIDDLE GROUND"
The previous section develops the point that the 
Forest Service has reasonably strong grounds for entering 
negotiations with the MRWRCC claiming substantial 
non-consumptive water rights--in spite of the Supreme 
Court's decision in the New Mexico case. It also suggests 
a number of general reasons why it might be to the 
advantage of the State of Montana to recognize all or 
some portion of those claims. Now, the task at hand is to 
explore some specific points of negotiation and recommend 
solutions that appear, at least potentially, to be mutually 
beneficial.
A . Process
At the outset, as suggested previously, there are 
a number of procedural problems that need to be remedied to 
assure that negotiations proceed smoothly toward a compromise 
These may be summarized as follows :
1) For greater efficiency, the existing requirement 
that federal "use rights" (those established 
before 1973) be filed with the Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation outside the
-71-
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negotiation process should be eliminated. (Or 
alternately, only non-consumptive uses might be 
excused from filing. Consumptive uses would then 
be filed by the statutory deadline, removing them 
from the negotiation process. Such uses, quite 
small in quantity in the case of the Forest Service, 
would then be subject to adjudication by the water 
judges).
2) To minimize the possibility that a ratified compact 
could be nullified by the state judiciary, the 
relationship of the compact to the final decree in 
the statewide adjudication process should be 
clarified by the Montana legislature prior to or 
during ratification of any forthcoming compact.
The Compact Commission, state political leaders, 
and state government officials must actively 
inform and involve the public, the state Congres­
sional Delegation, and special interest groups of 
the progress and objectives of the Commission.
3) Finally, in due course, the Commission should adopt 
internal operating procedures to ensure that 
differences in the political and philosophical 
composition of the Commission itself do not paralyze 
its ability to compromise.
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B . Authority. Beneficial Use, and Priority
One of the primary advantages of negotiation is that
the legal authority for a claim need not be firmly
established in the law for the claim to be recognized as
legitimate. In other words, the settlement need not follow
legal precedents already established. Nor do the parties
need to fear the establishment of legal precedent through
their agreement. The terms agreed to by both parties need
only be mutually beneficial. So, the MRWRCC should be
receptive to all Forest Service water rights claims
initially. Then, the final determination of the legitimacy
of the claims should rest on a careful balancing of federal
and state objectives.
In general, Montana law appears to have failed to 
recognize water uses without diversions prior to the 
passage of the Water Use Act in 1973.  ̂ There is, however, 
clear Indication that Congress authorized the Forest Service 
to use water in the stream for a variety of purposes prior 
to 1973. Forest Service instream uses should, then, be 
considered as "use rights" under Montana law, since they 
lawfully commenced prior to the passage of the Water Use 
Act. As a starting point, such rights should, in general, 
be considered to have a priority date of 1960--the year of
^For a discussion of Montana law regarding instream 
appropriations prior to 1973, see Albert W. Stone, Selected Aspects of Montana Water Law. Mountain Press Publishing C o ., (Missoula, MT), p. 30.
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passage of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act--unless 
otherwise established by specific documentation.
C . Quantification of Existing Forest Service Rights
Because of the negligible impact of most instream 
rights on other users, it is not vital that the exact
jquantity of every single water right be ascertained.
Nor is it practical to do so within the time limits imposed 
by existing state laws--for it would require considerable 
site specific data on each and every national forest stream 
in Montana. A more reasonable approach is to establish an 
approximation technique, using a variable (by geographic 
area) percentage of average annual flow as a maximum claim. 
Once established, these formulae could be used to calculate 
the approximate instream rights for each stream, at points 
either 1) at the national forest boundary or 2) above 
existing or state authorized diversions (or other uses). 
Those quantities of water so calculated would then be 
accepted and adjudicated as Forest Service rights, with the 
stipulation that, where there are conflicts with existing 
state authorized users, a more site-specific analysis will 
be conducted and a better approximation established. These 
conflicts would logically be surfaced during the preparation 
of the final decree in the upcoming general adjudications.
There is no reason, however, why existing Forest 
Service consumptive water uses cannot be accurately 
determined.
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For the purposes of the state, it would seem reasonable that 
the new claim be limited to a number less than or equal to 
the first approximation.
Using this approach, it is incumbent on the Compact 
Commission to establish 1) a procedure for determining the 
first approximation of Forest Service instream water rights 
and 2) a mechanism for site-specific analysis in the event 
of conflict with existing state authorized water uses. For 
this procedure to be effective, the Commission must retain 
the authority to make the final determination (which, as an 
amendment to the compact, must be agreeable to designated 
representatives of both parties). Only in the event of a 
failure to reach a compromise would the judiciary become 
involved in adjudicating such rights.
The general adjudication process will identify where 
existing Forest Service rights interfere with 
existing state authorized uses. The state water reservation 
process, on the other hand, is designed to balance instream 
and future consumptive uses. The negotiated agreement 
could stipulate that, where conflicts surface, site-specific 
analyses be conducted during the state reservation process 
to replace the first approximation values of Forest Service 
instream rights with more specific (and mutually acceptable) 
values. It must be emphasized that the standards and 
processes established by the Compact Commission, and not 
the state water reservation laws as they exist at the time,
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would of necessity be the governing mechanism for final 
quantification of federal instream "reservations." (For 
example, the current limitation on state instream reserva- 
tions of 50% of average annual flow of record and the 
authority of the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation 
to revoke or modify the reservation would not necessarily 
apply to federal rights unless such were part of a mutually 
defined set of criteria or standards.)
To summarize, all federal non-consumptive rights 
would be approximated within a short period of time for 
inclusion in the preliminary decree of the statewide 
adjudication process. The quantities so identified in a 
ratified agreement would be final determinations, except
l) where conflicts with existing state authorized, or use 
rights, are identified and need to be resolved prior to 
issuance of a final decree or 2) where applications for 
water reservations under MCA 85-2-316 make it apparent that 
conflicts with future needs exist. In both cases, the 
Forest Service would be required to conduct site-specific 
analyses for streams in conflict using standards established 
by the Commission. The new, or final quantification would 
be less than or equal to the original estimate and subject 
to agreement by both parties.
The net result of such a process would be to :
^MCA 85-2-316(5).
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1) Provide initially a reasonable estimate of existing 
Forest Service non-consumptive uses (and a precise 
quantification of the minor existing consumptive uses) for 
purposes of the preliminary decree within the statewide 
adjudication. Such information would not only speed the 
adjudication process, but would also be extremely useful
to state water administrators in water resource planning 
efforts--both inter- and intrastate.
2) Provide a final quantification of existing Forest 
Service non-consumptive uses at the completion of the first 
round of state water reservation determinations under
MCA 85-2-316. To the extent that state agencies held all, 
or portions of, the federal instream rights jointly under 
the state law--the state's ability to implement its policy 
to "provide for the wise utilization, development, and 
conservation of the waters of the state for the maximum bene­
fit of its people with the least possible degradation of 
the natural aquatic ecosystems"'^ would be strengthened.
3) Eliminate costly site-specific determinations of 
Forest Service non-consumptive water needs where no existing 
or foreseeable conflicts exist.
D . Quantification of Future Forest Service Rights
On existing reservations, once Forest Service 
non-consumptive water needs are quantified as discussed in
^Water Use Act [MCA 85-2-101 (Policy)].
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the previous sub-section, there should be no need for larger 
quantities of non-consumptively used water. Further 
exercise of reserved rights for such uses could be terminated 
by agreement. If additional needs do occur in the future, 
the United States may exercise its prerogative to purchase 
or condemn the water that would be needed. On any new 
reservations, the United States should agree to quantify its 
water needs at the time of reservation, and limit its 
claims to unappropriated water.
There are identified future needs for relatively 
small quantities of water for consumptive uses on existing 
reservations. The Forest Service maintains an inventory 
of such needs. The state should consider Forest Service 
claims for future consumptive uses up to an agreed upon 
cut-off date--perhaps 15 to 20 years. Claims should 
include those for all consumptive uses recognized by the 
State of Montana as "beneficial uses"--they should not be 
limited to the New Mexico definition of reserved rights.
In other words, the Forest Service would submit claims to 
the Commission for future consumptive water needs until, 
say, the year 1985 for all of its typical uses (range, 
recreation, fire protection, silviculture, wildlife, etc.). 
Once an agreement is reached, an upper limit on Forest 
Service consumptive use would be established in each river 
basin and water requirements in excess of that amount (or 
beyond the cut-off date) would need to be obtained under
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state law and through state processes. That would, in 
effect, constitute a relinquishment of unexercised reserved 
rights with a grace period during which the Forest Service 
could program money and develop its highest priority water 
using projects. From the state perspective, the uncertainty 
of the future intentions of Forest Service would be 
eliminated. Federal reserved rights would no longer exist 
after the cut-off date--the entire federal rights situation 
would then be integrated into the state system.
E. Reasonable Compensation
In theory, the reservation doctrine means that the
federal government need not compensate for an impaired right
junior to the reservation right. Professor Frank Trelease
(University of Wyoming Law School) concludes :
. . . The only difference resulting from reliance 
on the reservation doctrine instead of a more basic 
federal power is that in some cases where the water is 
taken from persons who have previously put it to use, 
the United States need not pay for the taking. The 
reservation doctrine is a financial doctrine and 
nothing more.̂
In reality, there are few cases where rights of others have 
ever been impaired by the exercise of Forest Service reserved 
rights. The Forest Service Manual (FSM 2541) calls for an 
analyses of any private rights that might be impaired by
5Frank Trelease, "Federal-State Relations in Water 
Law," National Water Commission. Legal Study No. 5. pt. V 
(1971), cited in Richard A. Marquez, "New Mexico's National 
Forests and the Implied Reservation Doctrine," Natural 
Resources Journal 16 (October 1976);996.
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proposed forest plans, and a consideration for the needs of 
other water users. But, in the scheme outlined above to 
quantify all Forest Service rights, there is a likelihood 
that a few cases of impairment may occur. The Commission 
should consider a requirement that reasonable compensation 
be paid to water users injured by the exercise of federal 
rights, and develop standards for determining the amount 
of compensation due.
F. Rights of Forest Service Permittees
It is Forest Service policy that the rights to water 
used by permittees on the national forest be held by the 
United States in order to maintain management flexibility.^ 
The agency has long discouraged permittees from filing for 
rights in their own name, though some have done so. The 
Forest Service may claim "use rights" in Montana for uses 
initiated prior to passage of the Water Use Act (or alter­
nately, these rights may be negotiated if the Forest 
Service is relieved from the responsibility of filing).
Uses initiated subsequent to 1973, however, present a 
problem. If the Forest Service or the permittee is forced 
to file for such rights under state law, the date of 
priority would be the date of application rather than the 
date of initiation of use. Since this situation was brought
^Forest Service Manual, FSM 2521.
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about by the Forest Service's reliance on the existence of 
reserved rights for those purposes, it is reasonable that 
such rights be negotiated with the Compact Commission. The 
agreement should allow retention of the date of first use 
as the priority date.
G . Administrât ion
Because of the large number of individual uses, and 
the small total quantity of water needed by the Forest 
Service for consumptive uses --it would save the state 
considerable administrative costs and headaches to allow 
the Forest Service to administer its own consumptive uses 
on national forest land (excluding land not reserved from 
the public domain). For example, changes in purpose of 
use, point of use, season of use, etc., need not be regu­
lated by the State--though periodic notification should be 
required.
On the other hand, the magnitude of Forest Service 
instream rights would seem to indicate that the state should 
retain control of any changes in purpose or point of use.
The agreement should not allow use of water to be changed 
from a non-consumptive to a consumptive use without state 
approval. On the other hand, it would generally be to the 
benefit of the state to allow water previously used 
consumptively by the Forest Service to be used non-consump­
tively in the future.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission 
is a new and potentially effective approach toward some 
progress (at long last) in federal/state/tribal relations 
concerning reserved water rights. With the passage of the 
Water Use Act in 1973, Montana signaled its intention to 
remove its head from the sand and make a sincere effort to 
recognize and meet its water rights problems head-on. The 
1979 Montana legislature continued in that direction by 
establishing the Commission and a system for statewide 
adjudications. The two processes link Indian and federal 
reserved rights with state authorized rights.
It is fitting that Montana should be the first state 
to embark on this potentially far-reaching effort, since 
it was in reference to a Montana case (Winter vs. United 
States) in 1908 that the concept of federal reserved rights 
was first articulated by the Supreme Court. Since that 
time, little real progress has been made through judicial 
or legislative efforts to integrate the concept into 
western water law. The time has come to abandon the 
traditional uncompromising federal and state positions, and 
seek an equitable compromise. The best, most efficient,
-82-
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and economical way to accomplish that goal is through 
negotiated agreements leading to a set of compacts between 
Montana and the Indian tribes and federal agencies 
administering land within its borders. President Carter's 
recent water policy initiatives lend support for that type 
of approach.
All federal reserved claims are troublesome to 
state water administrators, but there exists a sharp 
distinction between Indian and other federal reserved rights.
The trust responsibilities of the federal government in the 
two cases are vastly different. On non-Indian lands, the 
government must simply uphold the "public interest.”
Indian rights, on the other hand are private rights--and 
thus not subject to diminution in the public interest 
without just compensation.
Past history has shown that Indian tribes must be 
extremely cautious and knowledgeable before they begin to 
bargain with their water rights. Their future, as a people, 
depends on wise decisions concerning their use of water in 
combination with other resources. The tribes should guard 
against negotiation from an economic disadvantage, or 
allowing the government to negotiate for them. Ultimately, 
the Indian issues may well prove to be the most difficult 
to resolve through negotiation. It is an open question 
whether some Indian tribes have anything to gain by negoti­
ating with the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission.
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There is every reason to believe that the Montana 
Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission can succeed, to a 
large extent, in its goal of "concluding compacts for the 
equitable division and appointment of waters between the 
State and its people, the several Indian tribes, and the 
agencies of the federal government." A comparison between 
the elements needed for successful negotiations and the 
Montana situation leads to the conclusion that most, if not 
all, are present or potentially present (with possible 
exceptions in the case of some of the Indian tribes, as 
noted above). If the public is kept informed and allowed 
to participate, it seems likely that most interested groups 
have the chance to be recognized and accepted. The 
"reasonable standard" language in President Carter's water 
policy initiatives indicates, for the first time, a clear 
desire on the part of the federal government to compromise.
It is still too early in the negotiation process to determine 
if there is a genuine willingness to compromise on the part 
of the Commission--though interviews with some of its 
members leaves one with considerable optimism. Of course, 
one of the major uncertainties is the ability of the 
Commission to convince both the Montana legislature and the 
Congress to ratify any future agreement that might be reached
Though the cost of stalemate is a return to the "no 
progress" situation of the past, successful negotiations 
could fail to materialize if certain "bottom line" positions
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of both sides cannot be agreed upon as starting points.
For the Indians, that means that the state must recognize 
their property rights in water and their desires to turn 
their reservations into viable economic entities. For the 
federal land management agencies, such as the Forest Service, 
that means that non-consumptive water uses, for such things 
as wildlife, fisheries, recreation, esthetics and ecosystem 
maintenance must be recognized as legitimate federal rights. 
Without the legal means to provide water for such uses, the 
national forests cannot be managed as the public, and the 
Congress have expressly mandated. Management of such lands 
requires the accommodation of the need for change resulting 
from shifts in public needs and expectations --a concept not 
recognized in the United States vs. New Mexico decision.
Upon examination, there appears to be a viable 
"middle ground" solution to the conflict between Montana 
and the federal government concerning non-consumptive 
instream water rights. In fact, it will likely be to the 
advantage of the State to recognize most of such claims, 
to help protect many of the resources that Montanans hold so 
near and dear to their hearts. Modernized Montana statutes, 
and a more flexible national water policy have provided 
the opportunity, for the first time in a long while, for 
improvement of federal-state relations in water rights. It 
now remains for the Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission 
to unlock that opportunity.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTED COURT DECISIONS
Winters vs. United States. 28 S. C t . 207, (1908).
Established concept of implied federal reserved water 
rights for Indian reservations.
Arizona vs. California. 373 US 546 (1963).
Reaffirmed Winters doctrine, and expanded to non-Indian 
federal reservations. First actual allocation of water 
for non-Indian federal reserved lands.
Caeppaert vs. United States. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Confirms lack of distinction between Indian reserved 
water rights and other federal reserved rights.
Articulated the concept that "the implied-reservation- 
of-water doctrine reserves only the amount of water 
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the Reservation, 
no more•"
United States vs. District Court of Ea^le County, 401 U.S.
520 (1971).
Court held that the McCarran Amendment allowed a state 
court to adjudicate federal water rights established 
under the implied reservation doctrine.
Colorado River Water Conservation District vs. United States,
96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976).
Court held that state District Court has original 
jurisdiction in adjudicating federal water rights, 
including Indian water rights.
Colville Confederated Tribes vs. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 
' (Ü.S. District Court, Washington), 1978.
Non-Indian successors in ownership of previous Indian 
Reservation do not succeed to Indian reserved priority 
date (i.e., reserved water rights on Indian lands are 
limited to Indians). However, the Winter's right that 
formerly was associated with the allotment does not escheat 
back to the tribe when the allotment is sold to a 
non-Indian.
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Supplemental Decree. Arizona vs. Californiat 99 S. C t . 995
( 1 9 7 9 ) .
Although the quantity of water necessary for irrigation 
of land on Indian reservations may be the measure of 
the quantity of the reserved right, the use of that 
water is not restricted to irrigation or other 
agricultural application.
United States vs. New Mexico, 98 S. Ct. 3012 (1978).
Court found that Congress intended national forests 
to be reserved for only two purposes--’’to conserve the 
water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of 
timber for the people." Therefore, use of water under 
the implied reservation doctrine on national forests is 
limited to those purposes.
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